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Capital’s Wager in Mozambique 
This ARTiCLE TAkEs A bRiEF Look at the two economic bets for 
reducing misery in Mozambique, one of the world’s poorest countries, 
showing the complete schizophrenia between them: capital on one side 
and labor on the other, with capital coming out on top, as always.
Located on the east coast of Africa, Mozambique has been wracked 
by crisis since the 1970s, with economic, social, cultural and political 
consequences. it currently has one of the lowest rankings on the hu-
man Development index (hDi) formulated by the United Nations De-
velopment Program (UNDP). on the hDi ranking for 2002 (published 
in 2004), Mozambique placed 174th among the 177 countries listed. of 
the 36 countries with low hDi, 32 are in sub-saharan Africa. of the 50 
African nations listed, 32 have an hDi considered low, 17 have a me-
dium level, and one (seychelles) has a high index. 
since so many African countries have weak human development, 
and most of these were colonies until well into the twentieth century, it is 
logical to assume there is colonial complicity in the Mozambique’s plight 
of today. This colonial action in Africa was a way for capitalism to ensure 
cheap labor and to transfer wealth to the mother countries. The reasons 
why countries formed by colonialism in the twentieth century now face 
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similar macro-structural economic, social and political situations are the 
same when viewed in the light of exploitation and modernization, these 
countries are in similar critical situations.
The modernization of Mozambique, including the establishment 
of a national state and the implementation of socialism, occurred be-
latedly in the world context (in the 1970s): when nation-states began 
to lose weight in international relations and found their margin for 
maneuver and sovereignty constrained.
The late 1980s saw a shift to neoliberal policies and programs, 
aiming to revive the economy, which had been burdened with debt 
and unstructured during the period of developmental modernization, 
its productive capacity reduced to only one-third of its previous level. 
The process of economic modernization in Mozambique occurred very 
slowly during the colonial period, but with consistent signs starting 
in the 1960s. This modernization banner, though totally reformulated, 
was taken up again by the socialist Frelimo government, constituted 
after independence from Portugal. The crisis of modernity in socialist 
molds was particularly felt in Mozambique. but the reasons for the 
crisis cannot be laid on socialism alone, because the majority of Af-
rican countries also faced this crisis and only some of them adopted 
the socialist model. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the socialist 
experience in Mozambique was the deepest and most lasting on the 
continent (1976-86). 
After the second World War, when the new cycle of capitalist eco-
nomic growth accelerated the process of independence in the Euro-
pean colonies, Portugal held back in letting go of its colonies. in the 
case of Mozambique, this delay resulted in ten years of armed strug-
gle for national liberation. The struggle was led by the Mozambique 
Liberation Front (Frelimo), headed by samora Moisés Machel, its sec-
ond president (the first, Eduardo Mondlane, was assassinated by the 
Portuguese secret Police –PiDE– in 1969). Mozambique finally won 
its independence on June 25, 1975, after a short period of transitional 
government initiated on september 7 the previous year, during which 
the Portuguese colonial government shared power with Frelimo, with 
Joaquim Chissano acting as prime minister. When independence be-
came official, Machel became the first president of Mozambique, un-
der a single-party regime and a socialist constitution. The Front was 
transformed into the Frelimo Party in 1977.
With an economy dependent on neighboring south Africa and 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), at the time under racist governments 
supported by the United states, Mozambique suffered the effects 
of a war of destabilization undertaken by these governments, caus-
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ing incalculable losses. Nevertheless, Frelimo went forward with its 
projects to modernize the economy and the social relations begun by 
the Portuguese in the 1960s, by creating a strong state-owned sector 
and putting workers on the public payroll. The destabilization war 
started to become internalized in the 1980s, because of the failure 
of government projects to assure production, the absence of “tra-
ditional” values in the power structure, the abandonment to which 
domestic society was relegated (defined here as the great majority of 
the rural population with its own social organization predating co-
lonialism, which still exists today), and above all, the rearguard and 
substantial military and economic support given to the MNR (later 
Renamo) by south Africa1.
by 1983, the social, political and economic situation had deterio-
rated to the point of making Mozambique extremely vulnerable and 
dependent on humanitarian aid to alleviate the affects of the war, natural 
disasters and economic difficulties. That year the government made a non-
aggression pact with its neighbor south Africa (which did not succeed), 
and another agreement with the international Monetary Fund and the 
World bank (which did succeed), moving away from its socialist policies.
The economic problems faced were of different orders. There 
were internal factors resulting from the gap between the goals of Fre-
limo’s projects and its capacity to achieve them. This mismatch be-
tween what it wanted and could really attain was linked to historical 
factors. it was fruit of the socialist modernizing proposals, within the 
progressive framework of the reigning world system. but it also ran 
up against external factors provoked by the destabilization war, which 
aimed precisely to debilitate the country’s economy.
At the end of the 1980s, Frelimo promoted a series of changes, in-
cluding in the constitution and establishing a multiparty government. 
it abandoned the centrally planned model and shifted over to a market 
economy. in 1992 Frelimo and Renamo signed a peace accord, and di-
rect elections were held in 1994, with Frelimo winning and Joaquim 
Chissamo being elected president, a post he had already occupied since 
1986 when as minister of foreign affairs he replaced President Machel, 
who died in an airplane crash (possibly sabotage) in south Africa. he 
1 MNR stands for the Movement for National Resistance, later called the Mozam-
bique National Resistance. it was founded in 1976 by the racist government of ian 
smith in Rhodesia, and supported by diehard colonialists. With the independence of 
Zimbabwe in 1980, it transferred its staging areas to south Africa and made inces-
sant bloody raids into Mozambique territory. only later, with the adhesion of dis-
sidents from Frelimo, did it become a political party under the Portuguese name 
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, or Renamo, led by Afonso Dhakana, still its head 
today. it now has parliamentary representation and runs some important cities.
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was reelected in 1999. Frelimo also won the 2004 elections, under its 
new standard-bearer, current President Armando Guebuza. 
Peace has effectively been established throughout the country 
since the 1992 accord, despite the lingering effects of the long years 
of strife. The political situation has been stable, without the former 
climate of belligerence. The existing social and institutional violence 
is fruit of the normal process of capital accumulation between those 
who own and do not own goods and properties, with police and private 
militias imposing order. The effects –besides the psychological trauma 
caused by all the deaths and disappearances, the uprooted (data indi-
cate over 4 million had to flee their homes, in a country of 16 million), 
wounded and crippled– are the disorganized social structures, which 
are recomposing slowly, the return of capital and old production rela-
tions from south Africa and Portugal, with the same accents and strict 
control, and the same impunity required for the action of capital, as 
well as the protection of the powerful, only now of all colors.
if the present is nothing to brag about, the future holds little promise. 
The most optimistic forecasts envision it will still take decades to reach 
the 1973 level of economic output, Mozambique’s best. To face this situa-
tion, the Ministry of Planning and Finance starts from the premise that:
Without economic stability, there is no climate to stimulate economic 
growth, without which there is no way to reduce poverty. [...] econom-
ic stability is fundamental for economies to grow. stability is normally 
measured by variations in price levels, interest rates and exchange rates. 
These variations are determined, in general, by policies that affect de-
mand in the economy. These policies are monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policies, which are generally determined by governments (Franco, 
2000: 215-6).
in 1950, Mozambique’s population was around 6.5 million people. 
From there it took off, reaching 7.6 million in 1960, 9.4 million in 
1970, 12.1 million in 1980, 14.4 million in 1991 and 16.9 million in 
1999. it is the fourth most populous country among the 14 that make 
up the southern African Development Community (sADC). 
in 1997, the country’s GDP was calculated at between 2.4 billion 
and 3.4 billion dollars, varying according to the source (UNDP or World 
bank). in 1998, its GDP had reached roughly 3.9 billion dollars, of which 
the northern region contributed 21%, the central region 31% and the 
southern 48%. According to government reports, nearly 70% of the peo-
ple live in abject poverty, represented by both material and cultural pri-
vation, not to speak of privation of life itself. indeed, the country’s hu-
man Poverty index is the highest in the entire southern cone of Africa.
in overall terms, the economic results since the start of the cur-
rent decade continue to show concentration in the country’s southern 
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region, with nearly 51% of the people and 49% of the production, the 
standout being the capital of Maputo, which is responsible for nearly 
36.9% of the country’s output. The central region contributes 27.7% of 
production, while the northern figure is only 21.3%.
The national yearly per capita GDP reached 200 dollars in 2000. 
The importance of agriculture in Mozambique is shown, above all, by 
the fact that it occupies 80% of the people, although it only contributes 
30% to the GDP volume, while approximately 70% of aggregate export 
revenue derives from agricultural products and renewable resources.
Agriculture continues to be the activity with most weight in the 
economy, both at the national and regional level. but its participation 
has been declining over the years in favor of other sectors, such as in-
dustry and commerce. in 1997, agriculture accounted for 24.9% of GDP, 
while in 2000 its total share of the economy had fallen to 22.9%. in the 
same period, in contrast, the manufacturing sector racked up a solid 
gain, rising from 9.9% of the economy in 1997 to 13.6% in 2000.
Life expectancy in Mozambique is 42 years, against 48.9 in sub-sa-
haran Africa. According to the organizers of the UNDP Report, the data 
could have been “even more positive”:
had in not been hiV/AiDs, certainly captured by the birth and death 
trends of the population recount of 1997, and if the rate of economic 
growth had maintained the trend of recent years, the results would have 
surly been more positive. The results renew the hope that although there 
is still far to go, Mozambique is, in purely relative terms, ready to take 
important steps to reduce the needs of its population (PNUD, 2000: 21).
The literacy rate of the adult population is 39.6%, meaning that only 
some 6.4 million of the 16.1 million Mozambicans know how to read 
and write. The percentage of people attending school, from the elemen-
tary through college level, increased from 29% in 1997 to 36% in 2000.
Until 1975 Mozambique had colonial-style capitalism, with the 
strong presence of Portugal’s salazar regime2. With independence, so-
cialist modernization was imposed, conceived as a system to produce 
manufactured goods supported by a strong state, formally different 
than capitalist models. starting in 1992, a capitalist, democratic and 
liberal system was instituted. People, goods and capital could circu-
late freely throughout the country, from Rovuma to Maputo. The le-
gal system was adjusted accordingly, readying the country for its new 
international insertion, to the liking of big investors. however, never 
before did the country face such misery with so little autonomy. After 
all the contribution to the production of wealth for the world system 
2 Referring to António salazar, Portugal’s dictator from 1932 to 1968.
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in the twentieth century, the country was basically abandoned on the 
junk pile of the new world order.
Against this backdrop, in general lines, two economic policy pro-
posals were formulated at the end of the century by the Ministry of 
Planning and Finance, with the direct help of international organiza-
tions and respected university experts. They were presented as comple-
mentary, to form the main productive base for eliminating poverty.
The Mega Projects
Foreign direct investment (FDi) is one of the pillars of economic poli-
cy, used by large business groups, usually in partnerships, in planning 
their productive actions on a worldwide scale.
African countries have received scanty foreign investments, while 
suffering large-scale capital flight, “as the holders of assets transfer them 
to more secure places” (MacPherson, 2002, p. 134). For this reason, 
the Ministry of Planning and Finance sought to carry out institutional 
reforms to attract foreign capital, creating a scenario in which the re-
turn on private investments had risks proportional to those available 
abroad (might this be called the “Mozambique risk”, to keep capital 
properly nourished?).
in 1997, FDi in Mozambique totaled 65 million dollars, but in the 
following two and a half years this skyrocketed after the government 
approved a huge undertaking to produce aluminum worth 1.34 billion 
dollars. This was the Mozal Project, which started operating in June 
2000. According to the World Investment Report (2000) from UNCTAD, 
this investment put Mozambique in sixth place in the ranking of Afri-
can nations receiving FDi, behind only Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, south 
Africa and Morocco. in 1999, Africa as a whole received FDi of nearly 
10 billion dollars, a paltry sum compared with the 106 billion dollars 
that went to Asia and 90 billion dollars invested in Latin America.
since Mozambique’s GDP in 2000 was only about 4 billion dol-
lars, projects of this nature have a profound impact on the country’s 
accounts. And other mega-projects are on the drawing board: dou-
bling the capacity of Mozal, which will involve expanding the Cahora 
bassa hydroelectric facility; construction of a new hydropower project 
at Mepanda Uncua; the Temane and Pande natural gas project; the 
project for an iron and steel foundry in Maputo; the heavy sand corri-
dors project to exploit titaniferous mineral sands; and the Dobela Port 
project, to build a deepwater port in Maputo, among others.
studies carried out for the Ministry of Planning and Finance by 
consultants from harvard University reveal that these mega-projects 
will have a large impact on the country’s GDP and trade balance, but 
not on national income and the balance of payments, because of the 
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return financial flows for debt service payments and repatriation of 
profits. since the projects are capital intensive, a good part of the cash 
flow will go to pay off foreign creditors and for profit remittances. The 
impact of these projects on the creation of local jobs will be small, due 
to their technical characteristics. only five thousand direct jobs would 
be created in six mega-projects, with another fifteen thousand support 
jobs. This works out to over a million dollars for each job created.
it took two and a half years to construct Mozal. in 1998, 220 million 
dollars was spent on land grading and buildings, followed by another 
875 million in 1999 and 245 million in 2000 to acquire equipment. only 
6% of the project’s value was spent on goods, services and labor in Mo-
zambique. A key reason for this low remuneration of local factors was 
the fact that the subcontractors largely called on foreign resources.
The total annual production capacity is 245 thousand metric tons of 
aluminum, all for export, worth an estimated 400 million dollars. A year-
ly total of 500 thousand tons of alumina and 96 thousand tons of coke 
are imported, at a cost of 90 million dollars, besides the intensive use of 
electricity, supplied by Motraco, a new company with transmission lines 
running through south Africa, at a cost of 60 million dollars. Additional 
costs are 80 million dollars for imported services, 2 million for local 
services and 4 million for value-added taxes. The project employs about 
650 Mozambicans, with salaries adding to 5 million dollars a year (an 
average of about 7,700 dollars), along with 90 foreigners. other jobs are 
being created, such as for security services, food supply, etc.
The financial structure consisted of 38% equity capital, 50% senior 
debt (nearly all from south Africa, in the form of an export loan, with 
that country being the supplier of electricity) and 12% subordinated 
debt. The equity investment was 520 million dollars, divided among 
billiton (47%), Mitsubishi (25%), iDC (24%) and the Mozambican 
government (4%). The government’s part, 20 million dollars, was fi-
nanced by the European investment bank. The annual debt service 
(interest and amortization) of all the loans is 80 million dollars, and the 
direct domestic aggregate value is approximately 160 million dollars a 
year. The project’s production has an impact on GDP of slightly more 
than 5%, but the direct effect on national income, that is, the extra 
income earned by Mozambicans, is only 18 million a year.
Profits are around 65 million dollars a year, with the government’s 
share (4%) being 3 million. The contribution to the trade balance is 
positive 160 million dollars (400 million in exports less 240 million in 
imports), but the overall effect on the balance of payments is small, 
because all the profits are being repatriated except the government’s 3 
million. Thus, only the 4 million dollars in value-added taxes and the 
3 million in dividends accrues to the government. To this another 1 
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million dollars can be added in payroll taxes. because it is a duty free 
zone, Mozal is exempt from indirect taxes.
Phase 2 of the project, concluded in 2004 (but for which data are 
not available at this writing), was planned to double output. however, 
projections were that only 2,650 new jobs would be created for construc-
tion, and that the number to maintain production would only be 1,300.
other mega-projects are on the cards with the same size and output 
characteristics as Mozal. in other words, there will be a strong impact 
on GDP, some on the trade balance, less still on the balance of pay-
ments and very little on the value aggregated to the local economy 
in terms of job and income creation. since all output is earmarked 
for export, as is nearly all the profit, what these projects amount to is 
extraction of value from Mozambique, not because of its cheap labor 
supply, but instead because of the existence of abundant electric pow-
er (particularly important to make aluminum in the case of Mozal), 
along with a political climate accepting highly polluting industries 
and easy profit repatriation.
The government sees these mega-projects as important, because 
they are export oriented and “bring benefits by linking Mozambique 
to the international economy”. besides this, it is believed that “inter-
national trade has proved to be particularly important as a channel for 
development and diffusion of technology”. (Andersson, 2002, p. 553). 
only time will tell how justified is the optimism that Mozambique will 
benefit from aluminum production technology. but to continue with 
the harvard consultant working for the Ministry of Planning and Fi-
nance, in defense of the mega-projects:
The projects are showcases of the possibility of investments in Mozam-
bique. They improve infrastructure and spread many benefits to the 
citizens. They provide opportunities for the Mozambican labor force to 
learn skills. The mega-projects are also linked to Mozambique’s large 
natural resource base. beyond this, Mozal, MisP [Maputo iron and 
steel Project] and the sands Corridors all require huge quantities of 
electric power, and the availability of cheap energy has been important 
to their location decisions. An important aspect to Mozal has been the 
treatment received in Mozambique on the part from the European Un-
ion under the Lomé Convention. The aluminum produced in Mozam-
bique will be imported into the EU with tax exemption.
The mega-projects, however, will not resolve the unemployment problem 
in Mozambique. All are capital intensive and only a limited number of 
direct jobs are being create (Andersson, 2002:553).
The overall impact on GDP of the six mega-projects together will doubt-
less be large. if they are realized, they can cause GDP growth by 2010 
of around 37%, but only a 7% increase in national income, with 20 
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thousand new jobs. in this same period, it is estimated that another 3.7 
million people will enter the country’s labor market. What will be done 
with these potential workers? The experts have the solution. Alongside 
these big capital-intensive projects, they propose labor-intensive ones, 
also aimed at the export market, the so-called labor-intensive manu-
factured exports (LiME) investments. These are discussed below.
Labor-Intensive Manufactured Exports (LIME)
Labor-intensive manufactured exports should be a central element of 
a “pro-poor” development strategy, according to soumodip sarkar, an 
expert working for the Ministry of Planning and Finance, who feels 
that Mozambique has everything to attract investments of this type. in 
contrast with the mega-projects, which generate very few jobs, LiME 
industries can create them quickly. As an example, he cites the case 
of three factories built with Taiwanese capital in Vietnam that make 
sports shoes as Nike subcontractors, generating 45 thousand jobs. he 
also mentions Lesotho, which generated 19 thousand jobs in the ap-
parel and footwear industry with annual export revenues of 100 mil-
lion dollars. in this case, it must be remembered that these are values 
exported, not values aggregated to the country. he goes on to say that 
many of the so-called “Asian tigers”, such as south korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and even Vietnam, triggered their industrialization based on 
these types of industries. he also cites Mauritius, which transformed 
itself from a poor exporter of cotton to a rich country with diversified 
exports. And finally, he proposes that because of 
the high level of FDi inflows in recent years, and the abundance of cheap 
labor in Moçambique, one would expect that the country is ideally suited 
for labor-intensive manufacturing operations in areas such as apparel 
and textiles, agro-processing, leather goods, toys, sporting goods and 
electronic assembly. Moçambique’s fundamental comparative advantage 
and favorable geography place her in an advantageous position for at-
tracting LiME investments as an engine of sustainable growth and job 
creation. in addition, the tax environment is highly favorable, and the 
creation of export processing zones (sarkar, 2002:475).
but i ask how one can intend “sustainable development” to rest on an 
industry practically devoid of fixed capital, one that can be transferred 
to another country quickly in function of fluctuations, such as lower 
wages in another country or a domestic wage increase?
Later the planner confesses: “Recent large increases in the min-
imum wage, if continued, will also threaten to undermine Moçam-
bique’s competitive advantage in labor-intensive industries”. (sarkar, 
2002, p. 476). As can be seen, even before starting the process, there is 
already the looming risk of a possible increase in the minimum wage. 
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And this is in a country (attested in the same Ministry of Planning and 
Finance document) whose priority is to reduce absolute poverty and 
whose minimum wage is under 40 dollars a month... Either the pro-
posal for industrialization through LiME is not serious, or the inten-
tion to reduce poverty is not serious. i believe the latter is most likely.
According to the proposal, there are several advantages of this 
type of industrialization, namely: (i) passage of the Africa Growth and 
opportunity Act by the U.s. Congress in June 2000, opening the Amer-
ican market to these types of products; (ii) the “flying geese” phenom-
enon, in reference to the flight of investments from countries such as 
Mauritius, where wages have increased (when they rise, it’s all over...); 
(iii) the new sADC trade protocol, which facilitates these transactions; 
and (iv) the existing preferential trade agreement with Europe.
These industries, it cannot be forgotten, are generally based on 
individual or family labor, using means of production (sewing ma-
chines, glue, etc.) belonging to the workers, who receive the raw mate-
rials and only provide their own intense physical input, in a process of 
cutting, sewing and assembly, depending on the product involved. The 
company employing them does not have capital in the country, brings 
in its own raw materials for a piecework cycle carried out locally, 
and obtains a finished product to be sold in the international market. 
These goods are the world’s designer label pants, shirts and ties, the 
branded athletic shoes, and in a slightly more sophisticated process, 
the electrical, electronic and computer products. This, then, involves 
individualized labor processes that permit extra exploitation.
individualization of work is the process by which the contribu-
tion of 
labor in the productive process is defined in specific form for each 
worker and because of each worker’s contribution, whether in the form 
of autonomous or individually contracted work, based on a highly de-
regulated market (Castells, 2002:97).
This process, utilized in exports of labor-intensive manufactures, is one 
of the aspects of acute exploitation, responsible for exclusion of various 
countries and regions, and can be defined as indicating labor relations
that permit capital to systematically retain the payments/allocation of re-
sources or impose more rigorous working conditions on certain types of 
workers, worse than are considered the norm/rule in a given labor market 
in a determined time and place. This refers to the discrimination against 
immigrants, minorities, women, youths or other categories of marginalized 
workers, in a way that is tolerated or sanctioned by regulatory bodies.
A significant trend in this context is the emergence of paid child labor 
in various parts of the world, under conditions of extreme violence, ex-
ploitation and defenselessness, reversing the historical pattern of social 
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protection of children, existing not only in the last industrial stage of 
capitalism, but also in industrial statism and traditional agricultural 
societies (Castells, 2002:97).
The proposals of the iMF, the World bank and big capital (the LiME 
alternative), which have been accepted by various governments, such 
as that of Mozambique, a country where 70% of the population lives 
in absolute poverty, differ little, not even in cynicism, from the welfare 
programs for Africans in the colonial period.
From a novel perspective, the mega-projects act in the old Mozam-
bican picture with much dead labor and nearly no live labor, while the 
LiME initiatives act with much live labor and nearly no dead labor.
At the current moment of neoliberal globalization, there is no con-
vocation of the population, as defended by Frelimo in the 1970s and 80s, 
for participation and integration in the economy, either as workers or as 
consumers. integration in the globalized world is through a production 
process and not through a labor process. Much has been invested in 
Mozambique in the mega-projects, aiming at exporting and using little 
local labor. but capital does not extract now income from domestic soci-
ety. The high value added extracted comes from the high composition of 
capital that exploits little labor. Furthermore, these ventures pay few lo-
cal taxes, and do not produce for internal consumption. The integration 
in the globalization process is in practical terms the rent that big inter-
national capital pays to the government, for a space where it produces 
for the benefit of outside capital itself, along with a small local elite. 
To occupy the population, then, they propose labor-intensive man-
ufactured exports. These enterprises are not based anywhere because 
they are inherently volatile. They are an itinerant way of international 
exploitation that is part of the so-called globalized world. 
Nevertheless, Mozambique’s exclusion is not only social. Above 
all, it is economic. And political exclusion is a condition for economic 
exclusion. Mozambique has unconditionally adhered to all the letters 
of intention with the iMF and impositions of international lenders. it 
established the peace process with Renamo, democratized the coun-
try with direct elections, freedom of political parties, the press and 
circulation of capital, and above all, it brought good governance, per-
mitting high profits and their repatriation. 
The proposal of the iMF, World bank and big international inves-
tors, endorsed by the government, to attract mega-projects and LiME 
–in a country with 70% of the population living in abject misery– puts 
a new face on exploitation, but continues with the same colonial po-
litical objectives of despoiling the Mozambican people. The exploita-
tion and humiliation the people suffered during colonialism were jus-
tified as a mission to assimilate and civilize the natives for work and 
consumption, with the myth of development. Now, in the neoliberal 
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policies, exploitation and exclusion are presented with the objective of 
diminishing poverty and misery...
The absence of effective alternatives permits the flowering in Mo-
zambique of Mafia-style and paternalistic relations, known as perverse 
integrations. These are relations that did not exist in the country and 
now dominate the drug trade, arms smuggling, the actions of “protec-
tion groups”, etc., occupying leading positions in the world of busi-
ness, politics and society in general. They correspond to the forms of 
labor practiced in the criminal economy, generating their own profits, 
which by the legal rules are considered criminal. These relations are 
in full flower in Mozambique and give a particular dynamic to social 
exclusion, in articulation with global capital.
in the final analysis, the bets of capital for Mozambique are trans-
lated into mega-projects, with much dead labor and nearly no live la-
bor, and the efforts to generate exports from labor-intensive industries, 
with much live labor and nearly no dead labor. This is the essence of 
the current economic policy, which takes advantage of the reigning 
misery to increase the gains of big capital, borne on the bandwagon of 
democracy, peace, security and good governance. in this context, per-
verse integrations multiply in the breast of the people, without capital 
and without work, but other seeds are also being sown among the 
multitude, which will grow into future rebellions. 
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